Controversies In Agricultural Ethics
Agricultural practices are complex, and their parts are interrelated, so they cannot be understood or debated in isolation. In tackling complex problems, agricultural ethics draws on three distinct sources: (1) the classical ethical theories of utilitarianism, deontology (the theory or study of moral obligation), virtue ethics, and contrac-
tarianism; (2) the newly emergent subfields of ethics such as environmental ethics, animal and research ethics, food ethics, and biotechnology ethics; and (3) the ethical tools developed expressly for application to agricultural ethics, such as the ethical matrix devised by Mepham (2000) to guide ethical evaluation in agriculture by considering its major components: the biota (flora and fauna), producers, consumers, and the treated organisms. Three representative issues in the ethics of agriculture—the family farm, farm-animal welfare, and genetically modified foods—exemplify the complexity of agricultural practices and the moral and theoretical issues they raise.
The Family Farm Some of the most persistent debates in agricultural ethics and policy concern the preservation and value of the family farm. Traditionally the small family-run farm has been the central unit of rural life and agricultural production. This unit has undergone a precipitous decline because of the combined impacts of industrialization and agriculture (Burkhardt 2000, Zim-dahl 2006). Some liken the disappearance of the family farm to the waning of other technically superseded forms of production and livelihood such as blacksmithing; in this view the consolidation of farms into large corporate entities is a byproduct of an inexorable march of economic, social, and technological forces. From this perspective there is no ethical obligation to protect or preserve the family farm because of its supposed lack of economic efficiency. This narrowly economic view of the endangered family farm is rejected by a school of agricultural ethicists called agrarians, who argue that family farms have important socioeconomic, cultural, political and/or moral value that is irreducible. Because of those considerations, they argue, there is a moral obligation to protect and preserve small artisan farms.
Agrarianism is divisible into two distinct types: populist and traditionalist. Each offers a distinct vision of the significance of the family farm and a corresponding set of arguments for its protection (Thompson at al. 1994). Agrarian populism—as articulated by Thomas Jefferson and, in the twentieth century, by Harold Breimeyer and Jim Hightower—stresses the importance of the family farm to the social and political well-being of society. Jefferson praised the value of the farmer as a citizen whose ties to the land guarantee social stability because his or her private interest is linked to the prosperity of society. Breimeyer argues that small farms are viable and important social institutions because they guarantee the right of poorer and less educated people to self-employment and economic independence, thereby contributing to individual freedom and political liberty. Hightower views the small farmer as an independent entrepreneur whose interests must be protected by the government as a matter of social justice. The agrarian traditionalism articulated by Wendell Berry emphasizes the intrinsic value of the small farm and the agrarian way of life. Berry offers virtue-based arguments in defense of the family farm. He argues that farming develops a sense of unity with nature, shared community values, loyalty and responsibility within the family, and care and concern for the land. These qualities, he holds, are valuable for their own sake: They give a holistic meaning to life and act as an antidote to the alienation inherent in specialized activities such as intensive farming and manufacturing. For agrarian traditionalists, then, the family farm becomes ''a metaphor for the good life, ethically conceived, rather than a profession or an occupation'' (Burkhardt 2000, p. 13).
Traditionalist arguments about the intrinsic value of the family farm, with their ethical imperatives to preserve and sustain it as a way of life, provide a yardstick for evaluating moral issues in agriculture such as social justice, the impact of industrialization and biotechnology on agricultural practices, the environmental effects of agriculture, and responsibilities to the future generations (Burkhardt 2000). Champions of family farming argue that it fosters a concern for the land and a willingness to forgo short-term gains in order to preserve the land for future generations. This approach stands in contrast to industrialized agriculture, with its emphasis on productive efficiency; its intensive use of energy, water, and synthetic chemicals; and its contribution to erosion, the depletion soil fertility, and other adverse environmental effects. Because of those problems, the family farm has gained additional support from environmentalists, who see in that way of life an example of a sustainable relationship with the land that respects the needs of the environment and the interests of future generations.
Farm-Animal Welfare The development of industrialized agriculture in the twentieth century resulted in the transformation of animal agriculture from extensive, decentralized pasturing and cooping to intensive, concentrated factory farming. Whereas traditional, extensive farming relied on fewer animals that could move freely in large spaces and received individual care and attention, intensive farming involves the confinement of very large numbers of animals in very small spaces and barren environments, with the emphasis on economic efficiency, low cost, and high productivity. The care and handling of animals is highly mechanized and entrusted to a small number of unskilled workers. The change from extensive to intensive farming has transformed the human-animal relations, adversely affecting both animals and the environment. The introduction of cloning and genetic engineering has added more fuel to the fires of controversy surrounding industrial agriculture.
Confinement operations often restrict animals to isolated, small stalls or cages, making it impossible for them to move, turn around, scratch, or stretch their legs. In addition to physical discomfort, this enclosure leads to psychological and social deprivation that results in aggressive and self-destructive behavior patterns (e.g., bar biting in sows, tail biting in pigs, feather pecking in hens) and production diseases (e.g., liver abscesses in cattle) that foster the widespread use of antibiotics and vaccines. Branding and castration without anesthesia, dehorning and tail-docking of cattle, the confinement of sows into very small stalls, debeaking, toe trimming, forced molting of hens, and hormone injections are other ethically controversial practices associated with factory farming (Rollin 1995a).
In traditional extensive (as opposed to intensive) farming, there is an overlap in the interests of human and beast: The well-being of the farmer depends on the productivity and health of fewer animals, each of which has a high monetary value. This circumstance encourages humane husbandry that provides animals with a stress-free environment; adequate food, water, and shelter, and individual medical care as needed. In contrast, the structure and goals of industrial farming create a conflict between the interests of the farmer and the good of the animals. Intensive farming is an economy of scale. In the drive for profit maximization and efficiency, the care of animals is transferred to machines or low-paid workers without adequate knowledge and experience. Rollin (2006) notes that, from a purely economic point of view, it may be more efficient to kill a sick animal or let it suffer rather than spend time, money, and labor on veterinary care. Factory-farm animals, he argues, are objectified and treated as things whose only value is in the profit derived from satisfying humans' food needs. This cold economic calculus contrasts sharply with the humane techniques and goals of traditional husbandry and farming. As Roger Scruton (1996) observes, a major casualty of industrialized farming is the quality of the relation between the farmer and his animals.
Factory farming uses large amounts of natural resources (fossil fuel, water) and generates huge amounts of solid and liquid animal waste that contaminates the soil and groundwater, and gaseous waste that pollutes the air and contributes to global climate change and acid rain. Two proposed solutions to the environmental toll of intensive farming are organic livestock farming and the genetic modification of animals to reduce their environmental impact. Each alternative, however, generates further dilemmas. Organic livestock production is a form of extensive farming. It improves animal welfare but cannot eliminate the animal-waste problem; moreover, because it is less productive, organic farming cannot satisfy the nutritional needs of a growing world population. From an environmental perspective, the genetic modification of farm animals may be a better solution, but it raises concerns about the welfare and integrity of the animals and about human safety.
Which of the competing interests—human, animal, or environmental—ought to take priority? Can the amount of animal suffering in industrial farming be morally justified by appeals to human needs and interests? Can these seemingly conflicting interests be harmonized for the benefit of all? The need to answer such pressing questions led to the development of farm-animal ethics as a subfield of agricultural ethics. Farm-animal ethics emerged as a response to the growing public awareness of the suffering of farm animals in the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion of the scope of traditional ethics to include nonhuman entities such as animals (most notably in the works of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and S. R. L. Clark) and the environment (most notably in the writings of Aldo Leopold and Holmes Rolston III). The recognition of animals as subjects of moral standing led to greater recognition of the suffering of farm animals and to efforts to formulate an ethic of livestock production, most notably in the works of Bernard Rollin (1995) in the United States and Peter Sandoe (1999) and Michiel Korthals (2004) in Europe.
There are five distinct ethical approaches to the issue of reconciling the welfare of farm animals with the needs of humans and the protection of the environment (Korthals 2004). The most radical among them is the abolitionist approach based on Regan's animal rights view. In this view animals have intrinsic value because they are subjects of a life. Regan argues against the use of animals as mere means to human ends. He rejects commercial agriculture, animal experimentation, and hunting as irredeemably immoral. He leaves it unclear, however, what should be done with the already domesticated animals that depend on humans for their existence.
The animal-integrity approach is grounded in Holmes Rolston's view of species integrity, which appeals to the genetic integrity of animals as a basis for moral evaluation. It prohibits any manipulations or destruction of the genetic code of animals, thus condemning genetic engineering and certain kinds of breeding. This view, however, does not address welfare issues from the perspective of the individual animal. Rolston also ascribes intrinsic value to entire ecosystems. He criticizes the animal-liberation view and allows for animal agriculture as long as it does not encroach upon the environment. Rolston, however, fails to specify the criteria for defining an ecosystem and offers little help in resolving dilemmas raised by animal agriculture.
The animal-welfare view is perhaps the most influential and widely accepted approach to farm-animal ethics. It has been advanced by Rollin and Sandoe (1999), whose leading concern is the welfare of the individual animal. In this view humans have a moral obligation to maintain and promote the welfare of farm animals by taking into consideration their needs and subjective experiences and their ability to express their natural patterns of behavior. These philosophers call for improving the living conditions of farm animals and for ''conservation of welfare'' (Rollin, 1995b). They hold that animal agriculture and biotechnology (e.g., genetic engineering and cloning) are morally acceptable as long as they do not undermine animal welfare.
Korthals has proposed a pragmatist approach to animal welfare. Drawing on the ideas of the American pragmatist John Dewey, Korthals complements Rollin's welfare view with considerations of the environmental and social aspects of animal care. Korthals calls for ''differentiated treatment of animals, such that their specific function is considered, with proper partitions as it were being placed between farm animals, semi-wild animals, and pets'' (Korthals 2004, p. 93). Korthals recommends broader and tighter regulations of animal welfare and further research into optimal farming techniques and possible limits on meat consumption.
In response to the growing concerns about the welfare of farm animals, governments and professional organizations across Europe and the United States have enacted regulations to change farming practices, prevent animal cruelty, and improve the welfare of farm animals. Most prominent among them are the Brambell Commission of 1965, the Five Freedoms formulated by the Farm Animal Welfare Council in 1979 in the U.K., the Swedish law of 1988 abolishing confinement operations, a series of European Conventions for the Protection of Animals issued by the Council of Europe and ratified by the member states, and the European Union (EU) legislation on farm animal welfare.
Genetically Modified Foods The introduction of genetically modified (GM) foods has triggered heated debates over issues of safety and environmental impact. GM foods are derived from microbes, plants, or animals produced through genetic engineering. The process involves the artificial manipulation of the genes of an organism or the transfer of foreign genes into its DNA. The resultant GM foods contain genes that do not exist in nature and have new qualities that are unlikely to develop otherwise. The main goal of GM foods is to alleviate world hunger and make agriculture more economically efficient and/or environmentally friendly by achieving improved crop and animal yields; increased resistance to pests, diseases, and herbicides, thereby reducing the use of chemicals; and improved nutrition, shelf life, and palatability of food (Mepham 2000).
The crops that are most commonly subject to genetic modification are soybeans, canola, corn, cotton, tomatoes, and rape seeds, and the traits most commonly introduced are herbicide and pesticide resistance. The world's largest producer of engineered crops is the United States, where more than 80 percent of soybeans and cotton are genetically modified and more than 70 percent of all foods on the market are GM foods. The amount of land used for modified crops has also been growing rapidly worldwide (ISAAA Brief 37-2007).
The production and sale of GM foods raise an array of ethical questions with far-reaching moral, social, and policy implications: Are GM foods safe? What will be their effect on environment? How might GM foods affect farmers in the local and global economy? What are the responsibilities of food manufacturers, distributors, consumers and society regarding GM foods?
Thompson divides the various moral issues raised by GM foods into substantive and procedural concerns. The substantive concerns are based on moral, religious, cultural or philosophical beliefs held by individuals or groups. The procedural concerns pertain to the policies and mechanisms for making food choices in society. On the procedural level there is a growing consensus among ethicists that, in a democratic society, substantive concerns regarding GM foods ought to be taken seriously in policy making and food practices regardless of their scientific merit if the substantive beliefs are based on reasonable cultural, religious, or moral beliefs. Respect for substantive belief is grounded in the principle of consumer sovereignty, according to which individuals should be able to make food choices based on their own beliefs and values (Thompson 1997). In this view consumers must be informed about the origin of their food to exercise their choice, but there are divergent views as to the best way to deliver the information. Some believe that the best way to facilitate consumer choice is by mandatory labeling of GM foods, which is the policy of EU. Others claim that it is better to label non-GM foods because this would be more practical and will provide equivalent information. Yet others argue that there is no moral obligation requiring producers to label GM foods, and some question the efficiency of food labels in enhancing personal autonomy.
The substantive arguments for and against GM foods can be divided into extrinsic and intrinsic concerns (Comstock 2000). Extrinsic concerns focus on the effects of GM foods, especially their safety and environmental and social impacts. Intrinsic concerns, which are grounded in principles of respect and duty, question the very process by which GM foods are produced. Those who argue against GM foods on extrinsic grounds note that their safety has not been sufficiently established.
These critics point to potential allergens in GM foods, the possibility that newly created proteins may be toxic, and the risks of increased antibiotic resistance (Hopkins 2001). They also charge that GM foods pose environmental risks, such as contamination of conventional crops, the spawning of superweeds, and wiping out of innocent species such as the Monarch butterfly (Brown 2001). The proponents of GM foods counter that they are safe because they undergo rigorous testing and that no adverse health effects have been reported. The proponents claim that there is no significant difference between conventional food and GM food and that mandatory labeling is therefore unneeded. Supporters of GM foods also point to their potential in alleviating world hunger, reducing pesticide use, and promoting environmentally friendly farming.
The extrinsic objections to GM foods are contingent rather than principled. Such objections can be met by perfecting the technology for GM foods, enforcing strict safety regulations, and conclusively demonstrating that their benefits outweigh the risks. The more challenging task is to judge the moral status of GM foods without appealing to unsettled empirical claims. Would there be anything morally objectionable about GM foods even if they were proved to be safe and beneficial? Such questions lead to the intrinsic issues surrounding GM foods. Most intrinsic objections invoke the unnaturalness of GM foods; they are viewed as a sign of human arrogance and disrespect for nature. Other intrinsic critics claim that the technology is morally objectionable because it violates species boundaries and integrity. Apologists for GM foods claim that all such objections are based on religious, not scientific, principles and thus have no place in public policy. The intrinsic critics counter that the processes of Darwinian evolution have produced a wide array of species, each with its own integrity and specific boundaries. Other critics claim that GM foods represent a threat to the integrity of traditional ways of life and farming (Pascalev 2003). The policy debates about GM foods reflect broader ethical and philosophical differences about the role of technology in society, individual and social tolerance for risk, the value of nature, and the meaning of food.
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